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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between consumer incomes and ages of
the durable goods consumed. At the household level, it presents evidence from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey of a negative correlation between incomes
and ages of the vehicles owned, controlling for the size of the vehicle stock.
At the aggregate level, it constructs a dynamic, heterogeneous agents, discrete
choice model with multiple vehicle ownership, to study the relationship between
the distribution of consumer incomes and the distribution of vehicle vintages.
Two versions of the model are solved, one with the restriction of at most one
vehicle per agent and one with multiple vehicle ownership. For each version
of the model, the parameters are calibrated to match vehicle ownership data
for 2001. The moments of the income distribution are then varied to generate
predictions for mean and median ages of vehicles and the results from the two
versions of the model are compared. While these are mostly similar, some of
the differences are quite illuminating.
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1 Introduction
Expenditures on motor vehicles comprise the largest part of consumer expenditures
on durable goods.1 The durability property allows a vehicle to yield utility over a
prolonged period of time, and potentially to more than one owner during its lifetime.
This paper studies the role of consumer incomes in vehicle ownership decisions, such
as the age of the vehicle at the time of purchase and the length of the ownership
period, and the aggregate implications of these decisions for the distribution of vehicle
vintages.
Understanding the determinants of the vehicle age distribution is important for
the design and implementation of economic policies. The economic downturn of 2007
has induced the governments in the US, China, and many European countries to of-
fer consumers monetary subsidies for the replacement of older fuel-inefficient vehicles
with newer and efficient ones, with a double goal of improving environmental charac-
teristics of the vehicle stock and helping the car industry by stimulating demand. Yet
little is understood about the determinants of the demand for different vehicle vin-
tages, including the new ones. This paper shows that income plays an important role
in vehicle ownership decisions at the household level and constructs a dynamic model
that explicitly maps consumer’s income to the age of vehicle she chooses to buy and
hold, if any. Thus, at the aggregate level, income distribution is a key factor deter-
mining the shape of the distribution of vehicle vintages and ownership rates. Policies
that seek to affect sales and the distribution of vintages should take into account
the endogeneity of the current distribution of vehicle vintages to the distribution of
income.
The determinants of the vehicle age distribution are also of interest to the en-
vironmental scholars, since ages of vehicles are positively related to the emission
levels. Environmental engineers in Miller et al. [12] study the relationship between
per capita incomes and vehicle ages. The authors find a strong negative relationship
1Approximately 45% on average since the 1950s for the US.
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between mean per capita incomes and median vehicle ages for counties in Tennessee,
with correlation coefficients of −0.996 for passenger cars and −0.979 for light trucks.
At the cross-country level, Storchmann [17] finds that car prices depreciate slower
in developing countries than in industrialized countries, and that the economic life
of automobiles is negatively related to real incomes. At the micro level, Adda and
Cooper [1] use data on French household vehicle replacement decisions to find that
higher-income households are more likely to replace their vehicles, controlling for the
vehicle’s age.2
This paper presents additional evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
on the importance of income in vehicle ownership decisions at the household level.
Then, it develops a model and calibrates the parameters to match vehicle ownership
data at the aggregate level. The calibrated model is used to study how the distri-
bution of consumer incomes affects the distribution of vehicle vintages. The model
is dynamic, with infinitely lived, heterogeneous in income agents. The agents are
allowed to own multiple vehicles at a time, and can trade both new and used vehicles.
The vehicles of different vintages are vertically differentiated: younger vehicles are
assumed to be superior to the older ones in terms of quality. The trade in used vehicle
vintages is motivated by the heterogeneity in consumer incomes and the resulting
differences in willingness to pay for quality. The equilibrium analysis in these markets
is complicated, since the consumers are both buyers and sellers. To simplify the
analysis, most models in this literature assume either a limited number of vintages and
continuous distribution of consumer types or multiple vintages but a limited number
of consumer types.3 The model presented here has multiple types of consumers buying
2There is also a significant body of literature in transportation research on the determinants
of automobile replacement. Gilbert [7] is one of the first to estimate the automobile replacement
hazard functions for the US. The estimated replacement hazard is increasing in income. Chen and
Neimeir [4] contains a review of this literature.
3For examples of the former, see Hendel and Lizzeri [10], Porter and Sattler [14], Stolyarov
[16], and Chen, Esteban and Shum [5]. Except for Stolyarov [16], these models have only two
vehicle vintages: new and used. Stolyarov’s model assumes fifteen vehicle vintages and is used to
investigate the equilibrium trade pattern in a car market with endogenous prices. He does not study
the relationship between the distribution of types and vehicle ages.
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and selling vehicles of different vintages. The equilibrium price for each vintage is
computed as an approximation: the price is assumed to be decreasing with vehicle’s
age and the price function’s parameter is calibrated within the model with market
clearing condition. 4
Allowing multiple vehicle ownership is important, since the evidence from Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey indicates that vehicles of different ages are substitutes
at the household level, so households with larger vehicle stocks tend to have older
vehicles on average. The number of vehicles owned has a positive effect on the age
of vehicle at the time of purchase and a negative effect on frequency of replacement.
Survey evidence also indicates that currently in the US more than half of all house-
holds own two or more vehicles, and over twenty percent of households have at least
three vehicles. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper to model multiple
vehicle ownership. Two versions of the model are solved and estimated, one with
the restriction of at most one vehicle held at a time and one without this restriction,
and the results and predictions from the two versions are compared. While these are
mostly similar, some of the differences are quite enlightening.
In the model, the agent’s decisions depend on her income and prices of vehicles.
The incomes of different agent types are calibrated to match the empirical income
distribution for the US in 2001.5 Aggregation across individual agents determines
demand for different vehicle vintages, and the resulting vehicle age distribution. For
each version of the model, the single vehicle version and the multiple vehicles one, the
model’s parameters are calibrated to match vehicle ownership data for 2001. In both
cases, the model generates a strong negative relationship between agents’ incomes
For example of the latter, see Licandro, Puch, and Sampayo [11].
Chen, Esteban and Shum [5] also contains a brief review of the current literature on the durable
goods markets.
4The approach is similar to Adda and Cooper [2]; they, however, estimate the parameter of
the price function outside the model with micro data and use the market clearing condition in the
estimation of other parameters of the model as an additional moment.
5The year 2001 was chosen since it is the last year for which R.L. Polk & Co. provided the data
on the distribution of motor vehicles by model year to the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. Thus,
these are the most recent age distribution data that are publicly available.
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and the ages of vehicles owned.
The estimated versions of the model are then used to study how changes in the
underlying distribution of consumer incomes affect the aggregate vehicle ownership
statistics, in particular, the mean and median ages of the vehicle stock. Surprisingly,
while at the household level the relationship between income and the ages of vehicles
owned is negative, the model predicts a non-monotone relationship between mean
consumer incomes and mean age of the total vehicle stock. If the initial incomes are
low, increasing mean income may actually lead to the aging of vehicles by encouraging
entry of lower income consumers into vehicle ownership via purchases of older vehicles.
This finding suggests the possibility of alternative explanation to the observed aging
of the vehicle stock in the US from the 1960ies to the present. Both journalist and
researchers ([9]) have hypothesized that the increase in the average ages of vehicles by
more than 40% over this time period is either due to the increased durability of cars
or improvements in the environment. The results of this analysis, however, indicate
that higher consumer incomes and the resulting increase in vehicle ownership among
lower-income consumers can also be part of the story.
When consumer incomes and the resulting vehicle ownership rates are sufficiently
high, further increases in mean income lead to younger vehicle stocks according to
both single and multiple vehicle ownership versions of the model. However, with
multiple vehicle ownership there may be a reversal of this trend for the economies
with high per capita incomes, if the majority of households uses their high incomes to
increase the size of their vehicle stock, but consume older vehicles on average. Thus,
even though at the household level the relationship between income and vehicle ages
is positive, at the aggregate level it is non-monotone.
Both versions of the model predict that higher levels of income inequality lead
to older vehicle stocks, with some divergence in the predictions of two models for
the economies with very high levels of income inequality. For these economies, the
multiple vehicles version of the model generates a negative relationship between the
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income inequality measure and ages of the vehicle stock. Multiple vehicle ownership
results in a much larger weight assigned to the decisions of high income households,
and even though the fraction of these households in the population declines with
inequality, they choose to hold increasingly larger and younger vehicle stocks, shifting
the mass of the aggregate age distribution towards younger vintages.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents micro level evidence
of a negative relationship between incomes and holdings of vehicle vintages, using
the Consumer Expenditure Survey data on household vehicle ownership for 2001.
Section 3 describes the baseline model. Section 4 discusses the solution method for
the single vehicle and the multiple vehicles versions of the model. Section 5 describes
the estimation procedure and data used in the calibration, as well as the calibration
results and the decision rules as functions of income. Section 6 presents the results
of the model for the relationship between moments of the income distribution and
aggregate vehicle ownership patterns, including the mean and median ages of the
total vehicle stock. Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence: Consumer Incomes and Vehicle Own-
ership Decisions
The data on vehicle ownership by households in the US for 2001 were obtained from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) [3]. The survey is administered by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and includes detailed information on expenditures for
over 7, 000 households in the given year. The household characteristics and income
data are part of the Interview Survey component of the CE; the data for this com-
ponent are collected on a quarterly basis, with households in the sample interviewed
every three months over a fifteen-month period. However, income questions are asked
only in the first and fourth quarter. The data on household size, number of earners,
geographic location and population, age of the reference person, and total income
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before taxes over the past twelve months were chosen for every household interviewed
in the first quarter. The households with incomplete income responses were removed
from the sample, resulting in the sample size of 6, 381 units.
The data on vehicles owned or leased by each of the households are reported in
the Detailed Expenditure Files component of the survey. The survey asks detailed
questions about every household vehicle, including its make and model year, the year
it was purchased, and whether it was new or used at the time of purchase. The
information on the vehicle’s model year is particularly important for the purposes of
this project, since it is used to compute the age of the vehicle. Unfortunately, the
model year is recorded precisely only for the model years 1986 or newer, with the
survey giving ranges for older vintages. Thus, the methods for censored data need to
be used to perform the analysis.
The household decision on whether to own or lease a vehicle is modeled with a
probit regression. The independent variables include the income and the squared
income of the household, the household size, the number of earners, the dummy
variables for geographic location and population size, and the age and the age squared
of the reference person. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if the
household owns or leases at least one vehicle. The results are presented in Column
I of Table 1. They demonstrate that higher-income households are more likely to
own or lease a vehicle, and that the effect is non-linear in income. Households with a
larger number of earners are more likely to be vehicle-owners, possibly because they
need this transport mode in order to get to work. Also, households in urban locations
have greater excess to alternative means of transportation, such as public transport,
and thus are less likely to have a vehicle. More expensive parking and maintenance
may also discourage vehicle ownership in urban locations.
The tobit model for censored data was used to study the ages of vehicles owned
by households. The results in Column II in Table 1 demonstrate that higher-income
households tend to have younger vehicles. The results in Columns III and IV of
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Table 1: Modeling household vehicle ownership decisions
Independent
variable
I. Probit:
Own a
vehicle
II. Tobit:
Vehicle’s
age
III. Probit:
Purchased
used
IV. OLS:
Number of
years own
new
Income, $1000
0.0203 −0.0525 −0.0140 −0.0115
(15.86) (−18.8) (−20.27) (−2.51)
Income squared
−0.00004 0.00011 0.00003 0.00003
(−12.18) (11.47) (13.55) (1.71)
Number of
earners
0.2062 −0.2253 0.0856 −0.3536
(5.41) (−2.92) (4.62) (−2.71)
Urban location
−0.2258 −0.1815 −0.0126 −0.1473
(−2.09) (−0.76) (−0.21) (−0.29)
Num. of other
vehicles
1.0606 0.1359 0.5280
(20.93) (11) (4.42)
R2 0.1899 0.0203 0.0975 0.0824
Number of
obs.
6, 381 10, 334 10, 283 3, 757
1) t-statistics are given in parentheses.
2) Other controls include a constant, family size, geographic location and population dummies, origin of the
vehicle (Domestic, European or Asian) and luxury vehicle dummies, truck indicator, age and age squared of the
reference person.
Table 1 indicate that this is due to higher-income households being more likely to
purchase a new vehicle instead of a used one, and hold on to this vehicle for a fewer
number of years.6 A positive and highly significant coefficient on the number of other
vehicles owned or leased by the household shows that vehicles of different ages may be
substitutes at the household level. The coefficient values for this variable in Columns
III and IV of the table indicate that households with more vehicles are more likely to
purchase a larger fraction of them used, and also tend to replace each of the vehicles
less frequently.
The above analysis demonstrates that income plays an important role in vehicle
ownership decisions at the level of the consumption unit, including the ages of vehicles
6The analysis for the number of years a vehicle is held was restricted to the vehicles that were
new when purchased. The reason is that, in general, the number of years a vehicle is held depends
on the age of the vehicle, so the sample was limited to control for this effect.
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held. The next part of the paper presents a model that generates the relationships
between income and vehicle ownership decisions of the same sign as the ones observed
in the data. Since the number of vehicles owned is strongly correlated with vehicle
ages, the model allows multiple vehicle ownership.
3 Model
The economy is populated with a finite number of infinitely lived heterogeneous agent
types j = 1, ..., N . Each agent type j consists of a unit measure of identical consumers.
The time period in the model is equal to one year. In every period t, agents of type
j are endowed with income yj, which is deterministic and constant over time. The
agent types are ordered according to their income levels so that y1 < y2 < ... < yN .
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In every period the agents decide on their consumption of non-durable and durable
goods. The durable goods are i = 1, ..., n vehicles heterogeneous in ages ai = 0, ..., G+
1. Here n is the maximum number of vehicles an agent can simultaneously own and G
is an upper bound on the vehicle’s useful life. Thus, having a vehicle i of age ai > G
is equivalent to having no vehicle.8
A vehicle i of age ai = 0 is a new vehicle and its price p (0) is exogenous in every
period.9
The agents can trade both new and used vehicles. A used vehicle of age ai =
7The model presented here is similar to Adda and Cooper [1], [2] with two key differences: 1) In
Adda and Cooper income is stochastic, and heterogeneity of agents is due to the idiosyncratic income
shocks. Here agents maintain their place in the income distribution with deterministic incomes. 2)
Unlike Adda and Cooper, multiple vehicle ownership is allowed.
8An upper bound on vehicle’s useful life is necessary for computational reasons. However, for G
sufficiently large this assumption is not restrictive. According to the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook
[19], more than 16.6% of vehicles in the US where over 15 year of age in 2001. Unfortunately,
more detailed data on the age distribution for older vehicles is not available. The results here were
obtained for G = 30.
9As in Adda and Cooper ([1] and [2]), the supply of new vehicles is assumed to be characterized
by a constant returns to scale production function. Together with the assumption of constant mark-
ups, this implies that the price of a new vehicle is independent of the demand for new vehicles. This
assumption of the exogenous new vehicle’s price greatly simplifies the analysis. However, it may be
too strong, since the time-series analysis shows that moments of the distribution of vehicle vintages
significantly predict future prices of new vehicles.
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1, ..., G is traded at price p (ai) = p (0) exp(−τai), where τ parameterizes the rate
of price depreciation.10 The price of vehicle older than G is assumed to be zero,
p (ai > G) = 0.
In every period the agents derive utility from consuming non-durable goods c and
vehicles of ages A = (a1, ..., an) according to the following utility function:
U (A, c) = v (A) + u (c) , (1)
where
u (c) =
(
c
λ
)1−γ
1− γ
, (2)
and
v (A) = nα exp
(
−η m2
)
. (3)
Here n is the number of vehicles agent owns and m is the mean age of the stock.
Formally, n =
n∑
i=1
Iai≤G , m =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ai and Iai≤G is an indicator that is equal to one
when ai ≤ G.
The utility from vehicle ownership increases in the number of vehicles owned n
when α > 0, and the vehicles of different ages are assumed to be perfect substitutes,
with consumer deriving utility from the average age of vehicles owned. For small
values of η the utility declines slowly when consumer’s vehicle stock is young on
average, then picks up the pace as it ages, and slows down again when the vehicles
are old. 11 The utility from the consumption of nondurables has a CRRA form with
10The exponential functional form has been found to provide the best fit for the French and the
US used vehicle prices data by Adda and Cooper [2] with τ close to 0.2. I have also used the data
kindly provided by Matthew Shum, (used previously in Esteban and Shum [6]), to verify that the
functional form provides a good description of the price depreciation process in the data.
11The functional form for v is best motivated for the case of n = 1. Its shape looks similar to the
percentage of total US vehicle stock remaining in use as a function of age. Greenspan and Cohen [8]
use a similar functional form to estimate the scrappage of vehicles. They find that it fits the data
well everywhere except for the higher ranges of vehicle ages, where it declines too fast resulting in
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a scale factor λ.
Each agent of type j arrives in a period with vehicles of ages A = (a1, ..., an). In
the beginning of the period, she decides whether to retain these vehicles or replace
all or some of them with vehicles of vintages A′ = (a′1, ..., a
′
n). Whatever her decision,
next period she starts with a vehicle stock that is one year older than the one she
consumes in the current period. Formally, in every period each agent of type j solves:
Vj (A) = max
A′
{
v (A′) + u
(
yj +
n∑
i=1
pi (ai)−
n∑
i=1
p (a′i)
)
+ β Vj (A
′ + 1)
}
, (4)
where
pi (ai) =
 p (ai) , ai = a′iφ p (ai) , otherwise, φ < 1 (5)
is the selling price of vehicle aged ai, with φ parameterizing the fraction of value
recovered by consumer from selling her current vehicle.
Trade in the secondary market is motivated by the differences in consumer in-
comes. The decisions of how many vehicles to have, which vintages to replace and
which ones to hold on to depend on the prices of vehicle vintages. Ideally, these
prices should be such that the markets clear for every vintage. However, this is a
very difficult problem due to the linkages between markets for all vintages. Licandro,
Puch and Sampayo [11] obtain analytical solution for the market-clearing price in a
simpler model of a secondary market for vehicles with only two types of agents and at
most one vehicle per agent. Other works, such as Hendel and Lizzeri [10], Porter and
Sattler [14], and Stolyarov [16], have continuous distributions of consumer incomes
but fewer vehicle vintages. These authors also assume that the agents can own at
most one vehicle at a time.
The model presented here is more general, and the approach is to approximate
the tail that is not ”thick” enough.
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the equilibrium price function with an exponential function pa = p0 exp(−τa). The
depreciation rate τ is estimated within the model with a moment condition that
supply equals demand at given prices across vintages. The cost of this approach
is that the prices and the decision rules obtained with it are not the equilibrium
solutions, but rather their approximations.
4 Solving the Model
To solve the model means to find the price function parameter τ and the steady-state
holdings of vehicle ages for each agent type, such that agents maximize lifetime utility
taking prices as given, and markets clear for each vehicle vintage.
The numerical solution proceeds as follows. First, the optimization problem for
every agent type j = 1, ..., N is solved for a given value of the price function parameter
τ . Then the decision rules are aggregated to find the steady-state distribution of
vehicle ages in the economy. The steady state distribution determines the supply and
demand for each vintage, conditional on prices of vintages. Finally, the differences
between supply and demand are used to create a moment condition (average least
squares) to find the value of τ that would bring the markets as close as possible to
clearing.
For every agent type j = 1, ..., N the decision rules A′ = qj (A), where
qj : [1, ..., G+ 2]× ...× [1, ..., G+ 2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ [0, ..., G+ 1]× ...× [0, ..., G+ 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, can be
solved for using the value function iteration method. These decision rules are then
used to obtain the steady-state holdings of vehicles’ ages A˜j = [a˜1, a˜2, ..., a˜n], where a˜i
is a vector of vehicle i’s ages if vehicle i is held for several periods prior to replacement.
The number of periods a vehicle is held depends on the agent’s income level and the
transaction cost of replacing a vehicle φ.12
Note that dimensionality of the problem grows exponentially in the maximum
12Without transaction costs (φ = 1) the agent upgrades to her optimal vehicle vintage every
period.
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allowed number of vehicles n. In fact, even with n = 2 it takes a long time to
compute the decision rules and estimate parameters of the model for a large value of
G.
The approach adopted here is as follows. First, the model is solved for n = 1,
with the decision rules obtained via the value function iteration method. Second,
additional assumptions are imposed on the model’s decision rules so it can be solved
for the multiple vehicles case. In what follows, these assumptions and the solution
method are discussed.
Multiple vehicles model: Additional assumptions and solu-
tion
Several assumptions are imposed on the model in order to obtain its solution for
the case when n > 1. In the steady state, for agent type j,
• The number of vehicles owned nj ≤ n is constant.
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• Each vehicle i = 1, ..., nj is held for the same number of periods hj ∈ [1, G+ 1]
prior to replacement.
• After hj periods, each vehicle i = 1, ..., nj is replaced by a vehicle of age fj.
• The agent prefers to replace her vehicles at equally spaced intervals if possible
in order to smooth her consumption.
In other words, the agent has to buy all of her vehicles of the same age and hold
them for the same number of periods prior to replacement. In order to smooth her
consumption, she is assumed to make her replacements at equally spaced intervals,
whenever possible.
For any agent type j, let r = (r1, r2, ..., rh) be a vector comprised of the number
of vehicles replaced in every period of the steady state decisions.14 This vector r
13The agent is considered to own vehicle i if its age ai ≤ G.
14Index j is suppressed for convenience.
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depends on the number of vehicles n and the number of periods each vehicle is held
h. It is constructed with the last assumption, that the agent prefers to replace her
vehicles at equally spaced intervals if possible.15
The agent’s problem can be reformulated as follows,
Vj = max
n,f,h
{
h∑
t=1
βt−1 (v (n,mt) + u (yj + rt [φ p (f + h)− p (f)])) + β
hVj
}
or
Vj = max
n,f,h
{[
h∑
t=1
βt−1 (v (n,mt) + u (yj + rt [φ p (f + h)− p (f)]))
]
/
(
1− βh
)}
,
(6)
where
m1 = µ (f, n, h) and can be computed using r, and for t > 1
mt = [n (mt−1 + 1)− rth] /n.
Computationally the problem becomes one of iterating through different combi-
nations of n, f , and h, and finding the one that gives the highest value of Vj for each
agent type j.
As in the single vehicle ownership version of the model, the decision rules of the
individual agents are aggregated to obtain the steady-state distribution of vehicle
vintages.
15For example, if n = 2 and h = 1, then r = (2), that is, the agent has two vehicles and replaces
both of them every period.
If n = 2 and h = 2, then r = (1, 1) , so the agent replaces one of her two vehicles every period.
If n = 2 and h = 3, then r = (1, 1, 0). The agent owns two vehicles, each for three periods prior
to replacement. She replaces one of her vehicles in each of the first two periods of the steady state
rule, and none in the last period.
If n = 2 and h = 4, then r = (1, 0, 1, 0).
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5 Calibration
The economic environment is characterized by a set of parameters. Parameters de-
scribing the income distribution and prices of new vehicles in 2001
{
{yj}j=1,...,N , p0
}
are estimated from the data. For the multiple vehicle ownership version of the model
the decision unit is a household. The single vehicle ownership version of the model is
calibrated at the individual level, since ownership of at most one vehicle per household
is a very strong restriction.16
The data on the mean household income and the Gini coefficient in 2001 are from
the US Census Bureau.17 These moments were used to calibrate parameters µ and σ
of the lognormal density function. The mean household incomes by type {yj}j=1,...,N
were calculated from the estimated lognormal distribution and normalized by the
average household size by income groups.18
The price of a new vehicle, p0, comes from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [19].
The estimate used is the average expenditure per new car in 2001.
Parameter values for the number of agent types N = 500 and the upper bound
on vehicle ages G = 30 are chosen to optimize on the computational time, while still
resulting in meaningful predictions from the model. The maximum number of vehicles
is n = 4. According to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, in 2001 less than 3% of
the US households had a stock of more than four vehicles, so this choice is hardly
restrictive. The annual discount rate β = 0.96 is chosen to match previous studies.
In the price data from Kelley Blue Book and Edmunds.com, the wedge between the
trade-in and retail values is anywhere from 5% to 10%. Here I assume that it is 10%,
and set parameter φ = 0.9.
The preference parameters {η, γ, λ, α} are calibrated within the model.
16In the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey, over 60% of household own 2 or more vehicles.
17Historical Income Tables, Annual Social and Economics Supplements to the Current Population
Survey.
18The number of people per household is positively correlated with income. The data on the
average household size (the number of people over the age of 16) by income groups is from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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In the single vehicle version of the model, the values of preference parameters η,
γ, and λ are chosen to bring the model’s aggregate predictions as close as possible
to the data on the total number of vehicles per capita, the new vehicle registrations
per capita, and the mean ages of vehicles in 2001. In the multiple vehicles ownership
setting, the first two moments are taken at the household level, an additional prefer-
ence parameter α is calibrated, and an extra moment on the fraction of households
owning at least one vehicle is added to the procedure.
The data on the size of the vehicle stock, the sales of new vehicles and the mean
age of vehicles in the US are published by the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook [19], and
the original source of the data is R.L. Polk & Co. The Consumer Expenditure Survey
(2001) is used to approximate the fraction of households owning at least one vehicle.
The data in the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook are presented separately for cars
and trucks. For the purposes of this project, the numbers of cars and trucks were
added to obtain aggregate statistics. For the single vehicle version of the model,
the total number of vehicles and the new vehicle registrations were divided by the
civilian noninstitutional population over sixteen years of age acquired from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, to obtain per capita values of these data moments. For the
multiple vehicles version of the model, these values were divided by the total number
of households in the US, available from the same source. The data on the mean age
of vehicles are also presented separately for cars and trucks. The mean age of the
total vehicle stock was computed as the weighted average of the mean ages of cars
and trucks, with fractions of each vehicle type as weights.
The calibration procedure seeks to minimize the distance between the data and
the model’s predictions in the least squares sense. The criterion used is a weighted
sum of the distances between actual and predicted moments, with each component
weighted by the empirical inverse of the moment’s variance from the trend over a 35
year period (1967-2001) for the total number of vehicles, new vehicle sales, and the
mean age of vehicles, and a 27 year period (1979-2001) for the fraction of households
15
owning at least one vehicle.
The moment for the market clearing conditions across vehicle ages was also added
to the criterion. The moment used to estimate τ is the distance between supply and
demand, averaged over vehicle vintages. The final criterion was minimized via the
simplex algorithm due to Nelder and Mead [13].
The calibration results and decision rules for the two versions of the model are
presented below.
5.1 Single vehicle version of the model: Parameter values
and decision rules
The calibrated parameter values and moments from both model and data are pre-
sented in Table 2. With the assumption of at most one vehicle per person, the model
cannot generate more than 1 vehicle per capita. The calibrated model predicts 0.996
vehicles per capita, versus 1.0074 vehicles per capita observed in the data.19 The
model does well matching two other data moments, the new vehicle registrations per
capita and the average age of vehicles.
The estimated rate of price depreciation τ is equal to 0.1906.20 At this value of
the parameter, 8.7% off all vehicles are misallocated, meaning that they are either in
excess supply or demand. This is a measure of distance from the equilibrium, and it
is arguably not too large.21
19The data on the total vehicle stock in the US obtained from the Ward’s Automotive Yearbook
includes all motor vehicles, including heavy trucks and buses. The data on the number of passenger
cars and light trucks only would be more suitable for the purposes of this project; however, this data
is not publicly available. The estimate obtained from the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2001
puts the number of vehicles per person over the age of 16 at around 0.9. This is likely to be a lower
estimate, since the survey tends to oversample from the lower income part of the population.
20For comparison, Cooper and Adda [2] estimate τ = 0.2 using the Kelley Blue Book Data.
21The model assumes no international trade in used vehicles and no vehicle destruction in traffic
accidents.
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Table 2: Calibration results: Single vehicle, per capita
level
Parameter Estimate Moment (2001) Model Data
λ 15, 441 Total veh., PC 0.9960 1.0074
η 0.0006 New veh., PC 0.0780 0.0813
γ 3.5994 Mean age of veh. 8.5211 8.6
Least sq.
dist.
% misall.
τ 0.1906 Market clear-
ing
1.2911e− 005 8.6957
Figure 1: Average age of vehicles owned and Decision
rules by agent types: Single vehicle
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Figure 1 plots the decision rules and the resulting average ages of vehicles owned
by income types, from lowest to highest. The model predicts a strong negative rela-
tionship between income and ages of vehicles. The predicted average ages of vehicles
are the outcome of two decisions: what vehicle vintage to buy and how long to keep
this vehicle prior to replacement or, equivalently, what vehicle vintage to sell. Figure
1 shows that higher-income consumers choose to purchase younger vehicles. The ages
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of vehicles sold also decline with income. For each agent type, the difference between
the age of vehicle sold and the vehicle’s age when it is purchased is the number of
years the vehicle is held prior to replacement. This difference declines with income.22
5.2 Multiple vehicles version of the model: Parameter values
and decision rules
This section presents the calibration results for the multiple vehicles version of the
model with households as decision units. The agents are allowed to own up to 4
vehicles. Table 3 presents the calibrated parameter values and moments from both
model and data. There is an additional parameter α that was missing from the single
vehicle version of the model, and it captures the increase in household’s utility from
the higher number of vehicles owned. Another moment is also added to the estimation
procedure - the fraction of households that own at least one vehicle.
The model does well matching the data moments. The price depreciation rate τ
is equal to 0.0871, a much lower value than the single vehicle version’s 0.1906. Lower
values of τ make older vehicles relatively more expensive, so households demand newer
vehicles when prices are slow to depreciate. In the multiple vehicles setting, wealthier
households buy more new or slightly used vehicles, increasing the supply of younger
vintages. Thus, a smaller value of τ is needed to match supply with demand when
households can own more cars. At this parameter value, the percentage of vehicles
that is in either excess demand or excess supply by vintage is 10.8.
Figure 2 depicts the decision rules and the resulting average ages of vehicles by in-
come types predicted by the model. Notice that the relationship between the average
age of the stock and the household’s income is no longer monotonically decreasing.
Households with higher income may obtain higher utility from vehicle ownership by
22Due to an upper bound on the possible vehicle’s age, agents at the very bottom of the income
distribution are ”forced” to replace their vehicles more frequently. The maximum number of years
a vehicle is held is five (income type j = 16. It decreases to annual replacement for agent types
j ≥ 478.
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increasing the size of their vehicle stock, even if those vehicles are older on average.
The dashed vertical lines in Figure 2 separate households with different numbers of
vehicles. Observe that the number of vehicles owned increases with income, and that
for households with the same number of vehicles the average age of vehicles owned
declines with income.
Table 3: Calibration results: Multiple vehicles, HH level
Parameter Estimate Moment (2001) Model Data
λ 45, 111 Total veh., per HH 2.0080 2.0024
γ 3.2997 Fract. owners 0.8633 0.8705
η 0.0002 New veh., per HH 0.1177 0.1618
α 0.0328 Mean age of veh. 8.5867 8.6
Least sq.
dist.
% misall.
τ 0.0871 Market clear-
ing
1.2313e− 004 10.7841
Figure 2: Average age of vehicles owned and Decision
rules by agent types: Multiple vehicles
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For a given size of the vehicle stock, the age of vehicles at the time of purchase is
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lower for higher income households. Similar relationship holds for the ages of vehicles
sold and household income types. The difference between the age of vehicle sold and
the vehicle’s age at the time of purchase is the number of years a vehicle is held
prior to replacement. Note that this difference is larger on average relative to that in
the single-vehicle case, that is, the vehicles tend to be replaced less frequently. The
number of years a vehicle is owned declines with income.23
6 Results: Distribution of Income and Distribu-
tion of Vehicle Vintages
This part of the paper studies how changes in the distribution of consumer incomes
affect aggregate vehicle ownership patterns, with particular interest in the predictions
for the mean age of the total vehicle stock. Subsection 6.1 considers the effect of
changing the mean household income relative to the 2001 benchmark, holding the
level of income inequality and the price of a new vehicle fixed at their US in 2001
levels. In Subsection 6.2, the mean household income and a new vehicle’s price are
the same as in 2001, and it is the level of income inequality that is allowed to vary.
Both subsections compare predictions of the single vehicle and the multiple vehicles
versions of the model.
In both subsections, the values of preference parameters η, γ, λ, and α are as esti-
mated in the corresponding versions of the model. The price depreciation parameter
τ , however, is reestimated in both versions for every change in the income distribution
with a moment condition that demand should equal supply across vehicle vintages.
Thus, the implicit assumption is that the price of a new vehicle is set globally, while
the trade in used vehicles is limited to the boundaries of a given economy.
23For households with only one vehicle the relationship is non-monotone due to the upper bound
on the possible vehicle’s age.
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6.1 Mean Household Income and Vehicle Ownership
This subsection studies how changes in mean household income affect the model’s
predictions for the total number of vehicles owned per capita, the fraction of house-
holds owning at least one vehicle, the new vehicle sales per capita, and the mean and
median ages of vehicles. The household level predictions obtained from the multiple
vehicles version of the model are normalized by the average number of people per
household in the US in 2001, to enable comparison of results from two versions of the
model at per capita levels.
The mean household income is allowed to vary relative to the 2001 benchmark,
from 25% of the 2001 level, to 200%. The parameters of the lognormal density function
were reestimated to match each level of mean household income and the same value
for the Gini coefficient as in 2001. The estimated distribution functions were used
to calculate mean per capita incomes for each of the 500 agent types via the same
procedure as described in Section 5.
In both single vehicle and multiple vehicles versions of the model, for each value of
the mean household income, the price depreciation parameter τ is reestimated using
the average of market clearing conditions across vehicle vintages. Figure 3 shows how
price depreciation rates vary with mean household income in both versions of the
model. Notice, that though the scale is different, with smaller estimated values of τ
in the multiple vehicles version of the model, the trend is similar. The model predicts
that prices depreciate faster in higher-income economies, a result consistent with the
findings of Storchmann [17].
The uneven shape of the lines is the outcome of a discrete number of agent types
(500), and only a fraction of them making buying and selling decisions in every
economy. The low-income economies have the majority of consumers with very low
incomes. If prices were to depreciate faster, these consumers would purchase very old
vehicles. However, there would not be a sufficient number of higher-income consumers
purchasing younger vehicles and supplying the older ones, so the value of the market
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clearing moment would be large. A lower value is obtained when the price depreciation
rate is small, and the lower-income consumers choose to not own a vehicle. As incomes
grow, prices depreciate faster to stimulate demand for older vintages.
Figure 3: Price depreciation rate τ and Mean household
income
Figure 4a shows a significant increase in per capita vehicle ownership over this
range of relative mean income values. The increase in the total number of vehicles
per capita is much stronger in the multiple vehicles version of the model, since the
single vehicle version limits the maximum number of vehicles held per capita to one.
Figure 4b shows a similar pattern for the fraction of households owning at least one
vehicle. For the single vehicle version of the model, of course, the total number of
vehicles per capita and the fraction of households owning at least one vehicle are the
same.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between mean household incomes and the new
vehicle sales per capita. Overall, higher income economies tend to sell more new
vehicles per capita, but there are two notable exceptions: around 60% of the 2001 US
22
Figure 4: Vehicle ownership and Mean household in-
come
mean household income in both versions of the model and around 160% of this value
in the multiple vehicles version. These declines in per capita sales of new vehicles
correspond to sharp increases in the price depreciation rate τ and in vehicle ownership
per capita. In the first case, the mean income in the economy is sufficiently high for
lower income consumers to become vehicle-owners for the first time. The second
case applies only to the multiple vehicles version of the model: with mean incomes
above the threshold of 160% of the US mean income in 2001, most agents own at
least one vehicle, and further increases in per capita vehicle ownership are due to
the enlargement of the average size of the household’s vehicle stock. In both cases
τ increases to balance supply with increased demand for vehicles. At lower values
of τ , higher income agents prefer to replace their vehicles more frequently, so the
excess supply of older vehicles is too large. Better market clearing is achieved with
a higher price depreciation rate and resulting increased demand for older vintages.
This produces a pronounced decline in new vehicle sales.
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When consumer incomes are high on average, in the multiple vehicles version of
the model increases in mean income translate into increases in utility from vehicle
ownership through further enlargement of the average size of the household’s vehicle
stock, a larger fraction of which is purchased used. This trend is likely to be reversed at
very high income levels, much higher than the 200% of the 2001 US mean household
income. Eventually, every household would be so wealthy that it would hold the
maximum possible number of vehicles and purchase all of them new.
Figure 5: New vehicle sales per capita and Mean house-
hold income
The main result of this subsection is presented in Figure 6. It shows that the
mean and median ages of vehicles are non-monotone in mean household income for
both versions of the model. This is a very interesting result, since the model produces
a negative relationship between income and vehicle ages at the household level, yet,
at the aggregate level, this is no longer the case. In low-income economies, increases
in mean income may lead to the aging of the vehicle stock. This is due to the
lower-income consumers choosing to become vehicle owners for the first time as their
incomes increase. These consumers choose to hold older vehicles, so their decisions
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Figure 6: Mean and median ages of vehicles and Mean
household income
shift the mass of the age distribution towards older vintages.24
This result is intuitive and holds as long as consumer preferences are such that
willingness to pay for quality increases in income, a standard assumption in the
vertical differentiation literature. To illustrate, consider a more simple setting.
Suppose there are only two types of consumers, low income with income yL and
high income with income yH , yL < yH . Let nH denote the share of high income
consumers and nL - the share of low income consumers in this economy (nH+nL = 1).
To simplify further, assume that nL ≥ nH . The rest of the model’s assumptions are
also as simple as possible. There are two types of vehicle vintages, new and used.
Each period the agents decide whether to own a vehicle and, if so, of what vintage.
For given variance, pick the lowest value of mean income and set nL, nH , yL, and
yH so that in equilibrium low income consumers prefer not to own a vehicle and high
24The jagged nature of the predicted average and median ages in low-income economies in the
single vehicle model is due to a small total number of vehicles held by agents in the model.
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income consumers choose to purchase a new vehicle in every period and scrap their
used one. When yL is sufficiently low, there is only one vintage of vehicles in this
market in the steady state - new vehicles. Thus, the vehicle stock is new on average,
and the fraction of nH consumers own a vehicle.
For fixed values of nL and nH , higher mean income corresponds to higher values of
yL and yH . When the incomes of lower income consumers are sufficiently high, there
exists an equilibrium where low income consumers are indifferent between buying
used vehicles from the high income consumers and not owning a vehicle, and high
income consumers replace their used vehicle with a new one every period. In the
steady state of this economy there are nH new vehicles and nH used vehicles, so the
stock is older on average, even though this economy has higher mean income. The
fraction of vehicle owners is 2nH , so the aging of the stock is due to the entry of low
income consumers into vehicle ownership for the first time.
Finally, when all incomes are sufficiently high, in equilibrium all agents buy new
vehicles and scrap their used ones. The stock is new on average and everyone owns a
vehicle.
Figure 6 shows that for the economies with the mean income above a certain
level, and with the majority of consumers owning at least one vehicle, the single
vehicle version of the model predicts that additional increases in income result in the
younger vehicle stock. Thus, the mean and median ages of vehicles decline in mean
income, when the mean income is above some low threshold value. The multiple
vehicles version of the model also shows the initial decline in vehicle ages after the
threshold mean income value, however, this trend is reversed for the economies with
mean household income of approximately 160% of that in the US in 2001 and higher.
The explanation is the same as in the case of new vehicle sales. At high income
levels, increases in income lead to larger vehicle stocks for households and these are
comprised of on average older vehicles. Eventually this trend is likely to be reversed,
and at extremely high income levels every household would own the maximum possible
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number of vehicles, all of them new.
There is currently one empirical study of the relationship between mean incomes
and median ages of vehicles. Miller et al. [12] provide evidence of a strong negative
relationship between these variables for counties in Tennessee. There are two ways
to reconcile their findings with the results of the models. First, the relative mean
incomes of counties in Tennessee are likely to be concentrated around one. In this
neighborhood, both models predict the decline in mean and median ages of vehicles
with income. Second, the predictions have been obtained with the assumption of
no trade in used vehicles between economies with different relative mean incomes.
It is very likely that this assumption is exceedingly strong at the county level in
Tennessee, and the price depreciation rates do not vary much, if at all, by county. For a
constant price depreciation rate, both versions of the model would predict monotone
relationships between mean household income and vehicle ownership statistics: a
positive one for total number of vehicles per capita, fraction of households owning at
least one vehicle, new vehicle sales, and a negative one for the mean and median ages
of vehicles.
6.2 Income Inequality and Vehicle Ownership
In this subsection, the mean household income and the price of a new vehicle are
the same as in the benchmark model, and the Gini coefficient is allowed to vary
from 0.19 to 0.74, which corresponds to the largest range of values for this coefficient
measured across countries.25 As before, the incomes of agent types j = 1, ..., 500 for
each value of the Gini coefficient were computed using the estimates for the lognormal
distribution function.
Figures 7a and 7b show the predicted price depreciation rates τ from the single
vehicle and the multiple vehicles versions of the model respectively. Note that the
25See the United Nations Development Programme’s ”Human Development Report” for 2006,
2007/2008, and 2009 [18].
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Figure 7: Price depreciation rate τ and Income inequal-
ity
smallest values of the price depreciation rate are observed in the economies with the
lowest degree of income inequality. When the value of the Gini coefficient is low, the
income distribution is more concentrated around the mean. Low degree of income
heterogeneity means that consumers are more similar to each other. Thus, they make
similar vehicle ownership decisions and the resulting vehicle age distribution is also
concentrated. Higher values of the price depreciation parameter τ would lead to
the majority of consumers wanting to purchase older vehicles. However, the supply
of these vehicles would be low, due to a much smaller number of consumers with
incomes above the mean. Therefore, in the economies with low degree of income
heterogeneity, price depreciation rate needs to be low in order to induce purchases of
newer vehicles. Figure 9 shows that the per capita new vehicle sales tend to be higher
in the economies with very low levels of income inequality, though the relationship
itself is very uneven due to the typically small sample size for households purchasing
new vehicles.
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Both versions of the model also predict a positive relationship between income
inequality and price depreciation rate for the economies with Gini coefficients below
some threshold value. Thus, higher variability in incomes results in higher variability
in prices of vehicles, through larger values of the price depreciation parameter τ . More
dispersed income distributions lead to greater heterogeneity in vehicle age holdings.
However, for the single vehicle version of the model, Figure 7a shows that at very
high levels of income inequality there is a sharp decline in the price depreciation
rate. In these economies almost all income is held by a small fraction of very wealthy
households. At higher values of τ , even these households would choose to purchase
older vehicles, yet there would not be enough households to supply them. Thus,
smaller price depreciation rates induce demand for newer vehicles, which can in turn
be supplied to the increased number of below average income households once these
vehicles age. In the single vehicle version of the model, this leads to a pronounced
decline in ownership rates (see Figure 8a), increase in per capita sales of new vehicles
(Figure 9a), and an abrupt increase in the mean and median ages of vehicles (Figures
10a and 10b) at very high levels of income inequality.
The multiple vehicles version of the model produces a different, somewhat bell-
shaped relationship between income inequality and price depreciation. The price
depreciation rate peaks at the value of the Gini coefficient around 0.45. There is a
negative relationship between income inequality and price depreciation rates in the
economies with income inequality measure above this threshold value. This very
interesting result is due to most of the wealth getting concentrated in the hands of
the increasingly smaller share of households, who then hold the increasingly larger
share of the vehicle stock due to multiple vehicles ownership. The substitutability
of vehicles of different ages in household’s consumption means that households with
similar income and larger vehicle stocks tend to consume, on average, older vehicles.
To rebalance the demand towards newer vehicles, the price depreciation rate needs
to be lower in the economies with very high levels of income inequality. Figure 9
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Figure 8: Vehicle ownership and Income inequality
shows a positive relationship between income inequality and per capita sales of new
vehicles for the economies with high levels of income inequality, even though the total
vehicle ownership rates in Figures 8a and 8b decline steadily as an increasingly larger
fraction of the population becomes too poor to own any vehicles.
Figures 10a and 10b show the predictions of both versions of the model for the
mean and median ages of vehicles. The single vehicle version predicts that the vehicle
stocks should be older in the economies with higher levels of income inequality. As
income inequality increases, the mass of the income distribution shifts to the left,
so the majority of the population becomes relatively more poor. Their decisions
cause the mean and median ages of vehicles to increase, since they chose to hold
older vehicles. That it is not the case in the multiple vehicles model for very high
levels of income inequality. The high-income fraction of the population is shrinking,
but these household also have more income on average, and thus hold increasingly
larger vehicle stocks. Their decisions play the key role in determining the age of the
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Figure 9: New vehicle sales per capita and Income in-
equality
aggregate vehicle stock, and since these households tend to hold newer vehicles, the
stock is younger in the economies with very unequal income distributions.
The model assumes that vehicles of the same age are homogeneous in quality. If
high income households had other means of increasing their utility from vehicle owner-
ship, say, by purchasing luxury brands, the negative relationship between household’s
income and the average age of its vehicle stock would be weaker. At the aggregate
level, when income inequality is very high, the positive relationship between income
inequality and new vehicle sales and the negative relationship between income in-
equality and ages of vehicles would then become weaker or even disappear. The
predictions of two versions of the model would become more similar.26
26The empirical relationship between income inequality and moments of the vehicle age distri-
bution is difficult to establish due to the unavailability of data. For the US, the data on income
inequality at the state or the MSA levels are available from the US Census Bureau. However, the
data on the vehicle age distribution at those levels of disaggregation are not publicly available.
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Figure 10: Mean and median ages of vehicles and In-
come inequality
7 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to study the relationship between the consumer’s income
and her vehicle ownership decisions, and to analyze the implications of these deci-
sions for the moments of the vehicle age distribution by aggregating over consumers
with different income levels. For these purposes, a model of a vertically differenti-
ated market with durable goods and multiple goods ownership was constructed and
calibrated to the US data on incomes and vehicle ownership. The assumption of mul-
tiple vehicle ownership is important, since evidence from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey indicates that vehicles of different ages are substitutes at the household level,
and households with larger vehicle stocks tend to own older vehicles on average. The
equilibrium prices of used vehicle vintages are approximated with an exponentially
decreasing function, and the depreciation rate is endogenous.
The model predicts that income inequality and average incomes play an important
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role in determining the size of the vehicle stock and the distribution of vehicle vintages
in the economy. Some of the model’s predictions have been verified by earlier studies,
such as a negative relationship between per capita incomes and median ages of vehicles
(Miller et al. [12]) and higher price depreciation rates in higher-income economies
(Storchmann [17]). Other predictions would benefit from testing and further research.
Overall, this paper makes an important step in studying the relationships between
consumer incomes and the ages of durable goods consumed, at both the individual
and the aggregate levels.
A Additional statistics: Model and data
This section computes and compares additional statistics from both versions of the
model and from the data. These statistics were not used in the calibration of the
model. Figure 11 plots the age distribution of vehicles in 2001. The data on the
distribution of vehicles in use by model year have been obtained from the Ward’s
Automotive Yearbook. All of the vehicles 15 years of age and older are grouped
together in the data, so the same aggregation was done for the vehicle ages generated
by each version of the model. The three distributions look similar, but the distribution
obtained from the single vehicle version of the model is closer to the empirical one. The
conclusion is that the model does well matching the distribution of vehicle vintages
in the US in 2001.
On the other hand, the model generates a much stronger negative relationship
between consumer incomes and ages of vehicles held than the one observed in the
data. Figure 12 plots the average ages of vehicles owned by income percentiles from
the two versions of the model and data. The data come from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey for 2001. Note that the multiple vehicles version of the model does
better matching the ages of vehicles held by the upper fifty percentiles of the income
distribution, while the single vehicle version generates somewhat better predictions
for the households in the lower income half of the distribution. However, the pre-
dicted relationship between household incomes and average ages of vehicles held is
still too strong, especially for the lower income percentiles. This is due to two fac-
tors. First, the Consumer Expenditure Survey reports the exact model year only for
vehicles made in 1986 and after, thus the estimated average ages from the data are
biased downwards. And second, the utility function from vehicle ownership belongs
to the one parameter family, which makes it convenient for the estimation; however,
for older vehicles this function generates a rapid decline in utility. As a result, for low
income households small differences in income may translate in significant differences
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Figure 11: Age distribution of vehicles: models and
data
in the ages of vehicles held.
The model also underpredicts the average expected number of years a new vehicle
has been held, 1.3 in the single vehicle version of the model and 2.8 in the multiple
vehicles one versus 4.8 in the data. Notice that in the multiple vehicles version of
the model the agents replace their vehicles less frequently. This is consistent with the
results from the cross sectional reduced form analysis in Section 2.
The number of years a vehicle is held positively depends on the size of transaction
costs of replacing a vehicle. A modification of the model with larger monetary and/or
utility costs to replacing a vehicle would result in a higher value for the average
number of years a vehicle is held, as well as a less dramatic relationship between
incomes and ages of vehicles owned.27 However, higher monetary replacement costs
are not consistent with the data, and adding utility costs to replacing a vehicle would
increase the number of parameters to be calibrated, which is computationally costly.
The latter is also true of relaxing another assumption, that all vehicles of the same
vintage are homogeneous in quality.
27Schiraldi [15] finds significant transaction costs of automobile replacement. The estimated trans-
action costs (both monetary and disutility) for most car models and vintages are between 10% and
80% of the respective price levels, with the peak of distribution at 20% to 40%.
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Figure 12: Average age of vehicles by income per-
centiles: models and data
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